


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International Narcotics Developments

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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS

22 June 1977

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This publication is prepared by analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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COLOMBIA: Opium Poppy Cultivation in the Cauca Valley

Opium poppies are being cultivated in at least two locations in the Cauca Valley north of Cali, according to recent reports. This is the first indication of possible large-scale poppy cultivation in Colombia since the early 1970s when a number of extensive fields were discovered along the Ecuadorean border.

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One poppy field, or group of fields, estimated to cover approximately 10 hectares, is reportedly located between the towns of Guacari and Buga near the Pan American Highway. Another field, or group of fields, of undetermined size, is believed to be situated between the towns of Bugalagrande and Zarzal. Allegedly, the land where the poppies are being grown belongs to a family with a history of narcotics trafficking.

US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) information indicates that early this year a group of heroin traffickers in the Mexican state of Sinaloa, concerned about the government's poppy eradication campaign, decided they needed a safer, more reliable source of opium gum. They sent a number of peasants skilled in poppy cultivation to the Buga area of Colombia to experiment with growing poppies there. They also reportedly sent some 300 kilograms of seed to be used in the test plantings. (Each kilogram of opium poppy seed amounts to about 500,000 individual seeds, and if seeds were sown one to every six square centimeters--about one per square inch--300 kilograms would be sufficient to plant approximately 20 hectares.) DEA information further indicates that the traffickers had arranged to smuggle opium gum from the Colombian fields into Mexico for conversion to heroin.

a significant amount of opium poppy is under cultivation in the Cauca Valley. A large heroin production and distribution network is operating out of Cali. The organization

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obtains opium gum from poppies grown in the vicinity of Buga and Tulua. Some of the heroin is consumed in Cali, but the bulk of it probably is smuggled abroad via the port of Barranquilla. Another heroin ring operates in Pereira, about 100 kilometers north of Tulua but the amount and source of the heroin it handles are unknown.

Climatic conditions in the Cauca Valley are suitable, if not ideal, for poppy cultivation,

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If large-scale opium production does take hold in Colombia, it will pose a serious challenge to international narcotics control efforts. Well-established Colombian organizations now engaged in a booming trade in cocaine and marijuana could easily add heroin to their inventory of contraband drugs.

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BOLIVIA: More Positive Developments for Drug Control

According to a La Paz news article, Bolivian coca producers are responding favorably to "Operation Registration," the government's initial step in its proposed campaign to control the manufacture, smuggling, and consumption of cocaine. *Campesino* leaders, fearful of losing their traditional and lucrative crop, at first voiced opposition to La Paz' efforts to register coca farmers. The government's information campaign, however, explaining the motives of "Operation Registration" and the goals of the proposed crop substitution program apparently have allayed many of the *campesino's* fears.

An increasing number of Bolivian officials are becoming convinced that without adequate control of coca production, it will be impossible to have effective operations against cocaine trafficking. At the same time, the government is hopeful that reducing the *campesino's* dependence on a single crop will stimulate agricultural development and produce other economic benefits.

On the enforcement side, cooperation between Bolivia's Department of Narcotics and Dangerous Substances (DNSP) and the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) office in La Paz has been strengthened by the signing of an "Agreement of Reciprocal Cooperation." Among other things, the agreement calls for joint planning and coordination of operations and the establishment of a more efficient system of information between the two drug control institutions.


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Major Cocaine Producing Areas



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It is encouraging, however, that the Bolivian government is maintaining an interest and is continuing to take even small measures toward solving the complex narcotics problem.

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AFGHANISTAN: International Coordinating Committee

The International Coordinating Committee on Afghan Narcotics Matters is to hold its first meeting early next month. Although the formation of the committee represents some progress in coordinating foreign efforts to deal with Afghan narcotics production, the committee nevertheless falls short of what the US wanted.

Membership on the committee is to be limited to the Afghans, the US, and the UN. West European countries are at least as threatened by Afghan production as the US, and several of them are involved in anti-narcotics programs in Afghanistan. The Afghans have suggested that the US can represent the Europeans on the committee, even though the US embassy has told them clearly that it has no authority to do so.

The Afghans say they want the membership limited to avoid having to deal with a large unwieldy body. They may, however, be concerned that foreigners in an enlarged committee would tend to gang up against the Afghans. Traditionally, a major element in Afghan foreign policy has been playing foreigners off against each other.

The Afghan--Mohammed Yahya Maroofi--who will head the committee is acting director of a department in the Foreign Ministry. The US embassy had hoped a more senior official, who could give the committee stature and influence, would be appointed. Although the embassy reports that Maroofi will presumably have the support of high levels, the appointment of an official of his rank is probably indicative of the priority the government is willing to give to narcotics control.

Judging by preliminary discussions about the activities of the committee, the Afghans apparently see it as a way of obtaining support for specific projects. In the past, they have tried to link narcotics control with economic development--with the emphasis on the latter.

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The committee at least will provide an additional forum for the discussion of narcotics matters with the Afghans, and it could lead to greater coordination of anti-narcotics programs in the country. The basic problem, however, is not the coordination of foreign efforts, but Afghanistan's ability and willingness to take stronger action on narcotics. Foreign efforts since the early 1970s have brought a clearer commitment from the government to enforce the ban on opium production, to increase--largely because of foreign assistance--anti-smuggling capabilities, and to increase narcotics seizures. Unfortunately, there has also been a major--and very visible--increase in the acreage devoted to poppy growing.



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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

(Editor's Note: This item, produced for another CIA publication, does not deal specifically with the international narcotics situation. It is included here, however, because it concerns a developing political situation that could impact adversely on the international narcotics control effort.)

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Thailand: The Communists Take on the King

In the past few months, the Thai Communist Party (CPT) has broadcast increasingly vitriolic propaganda attacks against the Thai Royal Family, hitherto a sacrosanct subject. The party's decision to openly denigrate the monarchy may reflect the influence of the urban radicals who have joined the insurgency since the demise of parliamentary government last October. Another possibility is that the communist leaders may have concluded that the King's influence as a unifying nationalist force and active symbol against the communist movement could no longer go unchallenged.

The shift in communist tactics followed two dramatic incidents this past winter--the death of Princess Wipawadi Rangsit, the King's cousin, in southern Thailand, and an alleged insurgent ambush of the Crown Prince. In fact, neither incident was a deliberate communist attempt to kill a member of the royal family. Princess Wipawadi was killed when she ordered her helicopter into an active insurgent area to pick up two soldiers wounded in a firefight. The "ambush" of the Crown Prince was an exaggerated journalistic account of some minor insurgent activity in an area he was visiting. However coincidental the incidents, they caused a furor in Thailand and were played up as evidence of the communist threat to the monarchy.

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The communists' initial reaction to both events was restrained; they clearly were not anxious to claim "credit" for either incident. Only a month after Princess Wipawadi's death, however, the first oblique attack on the royal family was broadcast over the Communist Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT); the broadcast paid vague homage to the Crown Prince for risking his life in the countryside while government leaders "relax in luxury and safety," but went on to suggest that "institutions" held high can "fall hard, then break into bits." Within a few weeks, however, such ambiguity was abandoned, and propaganda broadcasts were characterizing the monarchy as obsolete and feudalistic. In recent broadcasts, the communists have become more explicit and vitriolic, describing the throne as "blood-stained" and ready to be thrown into "the garbage can of history."

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Although the party previously had avoided physical and verbal attacks on the royal family for fear of alienating the population, party leaders may have concluded that the royal family's popular standing has declined sharply because of its involvement in political affairs since the Thanom-Praphat military regime was overthrown in 1973. This is a questionable assumption. The King, and more particularly the Queen, have indeed come in for mounting criticism among Bangkok's intellectual and academic circles and are held responsible by the leftist students for the collapse of parliamentary government last October and the bloodshed that ensued at Thammasat University. The Crown Prince's marriage to his first

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cousin also prompted dismay and some derision among the Bangkok elite. The royal family, however, seems to be extremely popular in the nation at large and particularly among the rural villagers who have traditionally been the principal target of communist recruiters.

The King plays a unique role as a stabilizer and as the ultimate symbol of continuity in the potentially volatile political atmosphere of Thailand. The communists may have concluded, therefore, that the crisis of confidence his removal would undoubtedly cause would override public outrage against them and ultimately serve their interests.

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NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS

COCAINE COUNTRIES

Overview: Virtually all of the cocaine that enters the US originates in Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, or Colombia--the countries that compose the coca leaf-growing and processing region of South America. Each of these countries shares similar characteristics which facilitate the growth of cocaine trafficking and impede indigenous narcotics control efforts. For example, long and socially accepted traditions of smuggling, corruption among government officials and law enforcement agencies, and extensive, unpatrolled borders provide an ideal setting for cocaine trafficking. Lack of resources, equipment, and trained personnel, plus unsophisticated and frequently uncoordinated enforcement efforts, weak judicial systems, and poor cooperation among governments in the region further impede efforts to combat the problem.

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ECUADOR

Significance: Ecuador is the central conduit through which the bulk of Peruvian, and to a lesser extent Bolivian, coca paste flows en route to the final processing sites in Colombia. Over the past few years, tons of coca paste have been smuggled into Quito or the principal port city of Guayaquil. Some of this paste is refined into cocaine and sent to the US; the remainder is smuggled via small boats, vehicles, and light aircraft into Colombia. At present the majority of cocaine networks are centered in the coastal area of Guayaquil and surrounding Guayas Province. These networks maintain periodic communications and cooperate with one another when it is mutually productive. A number of individual Ecuadorean traffickers, and in some cases entire groups, are known to have collaborated with cocaine organizations in Colombia.


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Prominent Areas of Cocaine Smuggling and/or Processing




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Prospects: Conscientious leaders are beginning to perceive Ecuador as a victim country where the use of hard drugs, while not widespread, is nonetheless growing. This, coupled with a concern for Ecuador's deteriorating international image, has had some salutary effects. In recent months the government has taken specific actions to improve its overall narcotics control and enforcement programs. With assistance from US-sponsored training, the police and other enforcement entities have begun to show some improvement vis-a-vis the narcotics target; however, it will probably be some time before they become effective against the drug traffickers. Poor planning, inadequate use of personnel, and a lack of effective controls at the borders severely hinder their efforts. Even with the organizational improvements and a change in the enforcement priorities, narcotics production and trafficking are likely to continue and possibly increase given the [redacted] availability of the raw product, and the strength of the drug networks.


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Prominent Areas of Cocaine Smuggling and/or Processing



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COLOMBIA

Significance: In addition to its reputation as a center for smuggling and counterfeiting, Colombia has emerged in recent years as a focal point for international cocaine trafficking. Since the early 1970s many of the traffickers have grown from clusters of individuals or unorganized groups into highly sophisticated organizations. There is a great deal of communication among these organizations, particularly between entrepreneurs and dealers who exchange information for mutual protection and to improve business. Their organizational talents and flexibility have compounded enforcement problems and have greatly contributed to the resiliency and success of the networks. The organizations use commercial airlines, military aircraft, commercial ships, private planes, small boats, automobiles, buses, and the baggage of messengers known as "mules" to smuggle coca paste into Colombia and refined cocaine into the US. Estimates vary, but it is believed that as many as 1,000 kilograms of cocaine destined for the US may be shipped out of the country each month. Some of the larger organizations are reported to send as much as 100 kilograms in a single shipment. It is possible that the illicit drug industry in Colombia earns \$300 to \$500 million annually.

Problem: Cocaine trafficking in and through Colombia has spawned a pervasive amalgam of drug trafficking networks [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Moreover, trafficking is so entrenched in Colombia's socio-economic foundation that those involved have become almost impervious to enforcement efforts [REDACTED] Big name drug dealers walk the streets conducting their affairs with impunity. They are insulated from the accusations of citizens who fear reprisals [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Colombia's geographic location has furthered its role in international narcotics trafficking. It is a natural gateway between North and South America, and shares hard-to-patrol borders with five other countries. There are literally hundreds of clandestine airfields along the country's extensive coastline and in the mountains. Much of the commercial air traffic from South America passes through Colombia en route to the US. As a result, most drug networks have effectively

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scattered their distribution patterns and employed diverse operational methodologies to make intelligence gathering and enforcement efforts more difficult.

Prospects: Statements by some Colombian politicians have indicated that the government is beginning to realize that the trafficking has had a debilitating effect on Colombia,

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[redacted] Responsible military leaders, incited by a growing number of contraband and narcotics scandals in the government, believe that corruption in their country has exceeded the traditionally acceptable limits. They may have been applying pressure on President Lopez to correct the situation. Lopez, however, believes he is powerless to do anything about his country's drug problem. The Lopez administration, nevertheless, has been cooperating with the US in enforcement-interdiction programs, and Colombia has been receiving US funds and assistance to help combat the narcotics problem. The US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has undertaken two joint operations with Colombia's Department of Administrative Security (DAS). While not as successful as intended, the exercises have provided the DAS, which is equivalent to the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, with desperately needed training. The Colombians hope eventually to procure a sufficient number of planes, helicopters, patrol boats, and radar systems which will enable them more effectively to monitor and apprehend the cocaine smugglers.

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[redacted] Even under the best of circumstances the problem in Colombia is going to be a difficult one to solve.

Conclusion: The current efforts to control cocaine trafficking via bilateral agreements with those countries that are significant producers or major transit points appear to be gaining momentum, but they are still moving slowly. The magnitude of the problem is such that neither rhetorical "declarations of war" by bureaucrats nor even more substantive action by traditional enforcement elements will bring a quick halt to the cocaine traffic. The eventual control and/or elimination of the problem

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lies well down the road. In the interim, cocaine will continue to be popularized in songs, movies, and literature. Many people who have tried marijuana and believe that it presents no more "danger" for them than alcohol or tobacco are increasingly willing to experiment with cocaine. Both supply and demand, therefore, will probably increase; and the result will be a continuation, if not an escalation, of drug problems for North and South America.

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LEBANON

Significance: Lebanon is important in international narcotics trafficking primarily as a producer and exporter of hashish. It is also a potential processor and transit country for opium and its derivatives. Most of Lebanon's illicit narcotics finds its way to Europe, the US, Egypt and Israel. Recently there have been several reports that hashish farmers are taking advantage of the breakdown in law enforcement brought about by the 19-month long civil war to plant acreage in opium poppies.

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Most opium cultivation takes place in the upland Bekka valley, also the source of almost all of Lebanon's hashish.

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The civil war does not seem to have affected the large and capable network of Lebanese traffickers or their well-established smuggling and distribution systems. Most Lebanese hashish reaches the US via South and Central America, where traffickers of Lebanese origin appear to play a significant role in illicit narcotics.

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Opium Poppy Cultivation in the Bekaa Valley



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Problem: Lebanon's geographic location and its multi-national population make narcotics control efforts difficult. The comparatively long coastline, the high volume of marine and air traffic through the port of Beirut, and the long border with Syria facilitate smuggling.

Traditional attitudes toward the growing of narcotics also hinder enforcement efforts. Much of the land on which hashish is grown is owned by politically powerful figures, including several members of the Lebanese parliament. The area of the Bekka has traditionally regarded itself as independent of central authority and has looked on hashish production as not only profitable but quite normal. Government and UN efforts at crop substitution have met with little success.

The sectarian violence that plagued Lebanon from April 1975 until late 1976 led to an almost complete disintegration of the Internal Security Forces (ISF)--the agency responsible for narcotics control. Much of the ISF's communications equipment, transportation, and manpower simply faded away during the course of the civil war, and only tentative steps toward rebuilding have been made. The main narcotics producing areas around Baalbek and Hirmel in the Bekka valley have been under the effective control of the Syrian army for several months. For a variety of reasons, chiefly reluctance to emphasize their role as an occupying force, the Syrians refuse to take any action to control narcotics production beyond attempting to ensure that Lebanese-produced narcotics do not enter or transit Syria. Thus, there has been no attempt at enforcing narcotics production laws for over two years.

Prospects: Lebanon's primary efforts at this time are directed at reconstructing the badly damaged economy and solving the multitude of political problems arising from the civil war. Narcotics enforcement is likely to receive little if any attention in the near future, particularly as security forces will have to devote most of their time to enforcing cease-fire arrangements and preventing further outbreaks of confessional warfare. Narcotics producers and traffickers are likely to have an almost free hand in Lebanon at least for the next several months.

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BRIEFS

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FRANCE: President Giscard d'Estaing earlier this month named Mrs. Moniaue Pelletier as Special Narcotics Control Coordinator. Mrs. Pelletier, a member of the political bureau of the French Republican Party, is charged with evaluating the drug phenomenon in France, coordinating existing anti-narcotics programs, and drafting an appropriate action campaign by the end of the year. Her nomination has been well received, but the naming of a special assistant marks only the first step in coming to grips with France's growing drug problem. Government authorities are waiting to learn more about her ideas, however, before deciding what financial and administrative support she will receive. [REDACTED]

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GENEVA: International Narcotics Control Board Secretary Stepczynski revealed that he had received a letter from the Director of Medical Services in the Singapore Ministry of Health stating that *M/S Weeders Farmasytiske*, a Norwegian pharmaceutical company, was building a factory in Singapore to extract poppy concentrate from Indian poppy straw. The finished product is to be exported to Norway. Stepczynski said he was concerned about the impact of a new opium factory, given the problem of the current oversupply of opiates. Indeed, the construction of such a processing plant in Singapore could be a harmful precedent to overcome in view of the efforts to dissuade other countries, such as Laos, from commencing similar processing operations. [REDACTED]

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THE HAGUE: The Dutch government has rejected appeals to make a substantial contribution to the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC). This does not mean, however, that the Dutch government wants to keep itself entirely aloof from initiatives developed in the framework of the United Nations. The Dutch admit that the existence of the fund in itself can be a stimulus for the development of national drug policies in some countries. Some Dutch officials, however, regard the fund as an essentially US creation, heavily influenced by the US, and devoting disproportionate effort to combatting the supply of drugs at the expense of solving the problems of demand.

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INTERESTING READING

The Global Connection: Heroin Entrepreneurs, "Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency" - Volume I, July-August, 1976. Part 6 (page 2309) contains reports on the history, regulation, and legal status of cocaine. The most important feature of this section, however, is the comprehensive bibliography on coca and cocaine.

Drugs Outvalue All Other Crops (MEXICO)--TNDD, No. 303, June 6, 1977, pp. 55-56.*

Rowbotham Trial Testimony; Guilty Verdict (CANADA)--TNDD, No. 303, pp. 81-88.

Police Break Up International Drug Ring (NETHERLANDS)--TNDD, No. 303, pp. 99-103.

Swedish Report on Golden Triangle in Western Europe (SWEDEN)--TNDD, No. 303, pp. 104-116.

France Requests Extradition of Drug Suspect (FRANCE)--TNDD, No. 304, June 9, 1977, pp. 44-46.

Ban on Drugs, Prostitution Reiterated (VIETNAM)--TNDD, No. 304, pp. 53-54.

Commission On Drug Problem Recommends Stiffer Sentences (PERU)--TNDD, No. 304, pp. 66-68.

Coca Control Reported To Be Ineffective (PERU)--TNDD, No. 304, pp. 69-73.

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